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FRITZ B. BURNS LECTURE
CENTRAL BANK: THE METHODOLOGY,
THE MESSAGE, AND THE FUTURE
Therese H. Maynard*
In the spring of 1994, the Supreme Court handed down a
bombshell of an opinion in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank.'
The Court ruled that there is no implied right of action for aiding and
abetting a violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19342 (Exchange Act) or rule 10b-53 promulgated thereunder.4
Central Bank's narrow holding foreshadowed a wide-ranging debate
and ushered in a new era of proposals to reform the federal securities
laws.
5
The Supreme Court's Central Bank opinion sparked an intense
response from all quarters that even addressed issues beyond the
Supreme Court's narrow holding. The responses ranged from concern
about the implications of the holding itself6 to much broader
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. I was fortunate to serve as Chair of the
Fourth Annual Fritz B. Bums Lecture that took place on the evening of March 13, 1995
at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. I would like to thank the Fritz B. Burns
Foundation for its generous financial support. I also would like to thank my colleague,
Professor Kathryn Tate, for her insightful comments and Anastasia Liakas, Loyola Law
School, Class of 1997 for her invaluable research assistance.
1. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
4. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
5. In the 1994 fall elections following the Central Bank decision, Republican victories
swept both houses of Congress. Robert Shogan & David Lauter, Republicans Score a
Sweeping Victory, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9,1994, at Al. These overwhelming victories changed
the face of Congress and further intensified interest in implementing dramatic securities
litigation reform proposals. See Roger Lowenstein, House Aims to Fix Securities Laws,
But, Indeed, Is the System Broke?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1995, at Cl.
6. See, e.g., Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Securities Law Litigation Following
'Central Bank,' N.Y. L.., Nov. 17, 1994, at 5; Edward Brodsky, Aiding and Abetting, N.Y.
L.J., June 8, 1994, at 3; Thom Weidlich, Professionals Still at Risk, NAT'L L.J., July 18,
1994, at A6.
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criticisms focusing on the analytical approach the Court used to reach
its conclusion.7
In the midst of this swirling discussion over Central Bank's
implications, it became clear that Central Bank would remain the
focus of public debate for some time to come. Therefore, in the
immediate aftermath of the Court's ruling, the theme of the Fourth
Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture' (Lecture) was fixed-"Central Bank:
The Methodology, the Message, and the Future."
Loyola Law School was quite fortunate to bring two very diverse
perspectives to the Lecture, as reflected in the papers presented by
our two principal speakers: Professors Melvin Eisenberg and Joseph
Grundfest. Simon Lore, the current General Counsel of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), added insightful
commentary from the regulators' perspective. These three well
known scholars of rule 10b-5 jurisprudence provided a thorough and
penetrating examination of the issues surfacing in the wake of the
Central Bank decision.
This Symposium issue unfolds as the evening un-
folded-presenting Professors Eisenberg and Grundfest's formal
articles in which they more thoroughly develop the themes they
presented at the Lecture. Simon Lome followed the presentations
with a thought provoking commentary. This issue captures the
dynamic quality of the evening by including a transcript of Mr.
Lore's commentary and the spirited panel discussion that followed.
At issue in this debate are not only the scope and contours of
the rule 10b-5 remedy, but also its very viability. This most recent
ruling on rule 10b-5 has fueled renewed debate over the judiciary's
role in interpreting and defining the scope of this implied remedy.9
Indeed, some commentators have gone so far as to question the very
premises of implied causes of action that are based-as rule 10b-5
7. See, e.g., Patrick J. McNulty, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver: The End of Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b), 29 ToRT AND INS.
L.J. 847, 858 (1994); T. James Lee, Jr., Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank. Plain
Language and the Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 269, 284-85; Glen Wallace Roberts II, Note, 10(b) or not 10(b):
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1239, 1265-66
(1995).
8. The Annual Fritz B. Bums Lecture is hosted by Loyola Law School in Los
Angeles and financially sponsored by the Fritz B. Bums Foundation.
9. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal




is-on "exceedingly vague or incomplete statutory language."'
Thus, the Lecture was delivered at a time when there was renewed
reflection over the propriety of this implied remedy, a view seemingly
reinforced by the Supreme Court's rhetoric in its Central Bank
opinion.
This controversy does not find its origins in Central Bank. The
Supreme Court recognized almost twenty years ago the inherent
tension in the implied private right of action under rule 10b-5 when
it observed that it was being asked to interpret a cause of action that
"neither Congress nor the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC
or Commission) ever intended to create."' "
Professor Grundfest's article presents his plea for viewing rule
10b-5 jurisprudence as an effort to interpret a statutory provision that
has all the substance of an inkblot.'2 Professor Grundfest argues
that section 10(b) and the implied private remedy under rule 10b-5
can best be viewed as a quintessential example of a legislative ink-
blot. 3 Seen from this vantage point, the courts then take on the role
of "Rorschachian analysts"' 4 as they struggle to interpret the
statutory inkblot. Their efforts provoke the criticism, from academics
and other Monday morning Rorschachian analysts, that the courts
misconstrue in some respect the essential meaning of this piece of
legislative expression. 5 Professor Grundfest then posits that the
Central Bank decision provides a classic illustration of section 10(b)'s
inkblot characteristics, 6 and offers an explanation for why the Court
feels constrained to take a strict-textualist approach to interpreting
rule 10b-5.' 7
To support his perspective, Professor Grundfest offers an
analysis of the Supreme Court's pattern of decision making in Part II
10. See Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget That It Is an Inkblot We Are
Expounding: Section 10(b) As Rorschach Test, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 41, 41 (1995).
11. Id at 44; see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (In a
landmark decision eliminating liability under rule 10b-5 for negligent conduct alone, the
Court also observed that § 10(b) "does not by its terms create an express civil remedy for
its violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or the Commission when adopting
Rule 10b-5, contemplated such a remedy." (footnotes omitted)).
12. See Grundfest, supra note 10, at 44.
13. Id. at 43.
14. See id. at 42.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 43.
17. See id. at 44-45.
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of his article, 8 positing that if these statutes are inkblots, then we
should "observe a higher than normal incidence of sharply split
decisions involving the formation of unstable and unusual coali-
tions."' 9 His analysis suggests why "the Court has split 5-4 in cases
18. Part II of Professor Grundfest's article was not included as part of his oral
presentation at the Lecture; therefore, the panel's exchange did not address his analysis
of the Court's pattern of decision making.
19. Grundfest, supra note 10, at 47. While Professor Grundfest's analysis is
interesting, there is at least one other explanation for the evidence of unstable coalitions
and the incidence of close votes reflected in the Supreme Court's recent decisions
involving the federal securities laws. This alternative explanation of the Supreme Court's
decisions rests on two jurisprudential values that go well beyond the scope of interpreting
the federal securities laws-the doctrine of implied liability and the principle of stare
decisis. Combined, these important values offer a more complete understanding of the
evidence presented by Professor Grundfest.
This explanation recognizes that the Supreme Court's decisions over the past twenty
years or so have reflected growing hostility towards implied remedies in general and
particularly the implied private remedy of rule 10b-5. See 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 52-55 (2d ed. 1990). Out of this
sense of hostility to implied remedies in general, the Court has seemingly taken advantage
of every opportunity to curtail the availability of rule 10b-5, but has stopped short of an
outright repudiation of this implied cause of action. IL The Court's refusal to eliminate
this remedy could derive from its strong sense of commitment to the doctrine of stare
decisis. In other words, the willingness of individual Justices to act on their hostility to this
implied remedy could be tempered to some extent by the strength of commitment that
each Justice places on stare decisis.
As such, a particular Justice may be hostile to the implied remedy of rule 10b-5 and
therefore not inclined to interpret the contours of this remedy broadly. This same Justice
nonetheless may feel compelled to give force and effect to the rule 10b-5 remedy in a
manner consistent with precedent out of keenly felt jurisprudential considerations
grounded in the doctrine of stare decisis. The logical extension of this perspective then
focuses on the degree to which each Justice feels bound, not just by the Court's prior
pronouncements, but also by lower court precedent that has taken root over a substantial
period of time. Indeed, this was the situation presented in the Central Bank case, where
every single one of the appellate courts to consider the issue had decided that there was
an implied cause of action for aiding and abetting a rule 10b-5 violation. Central Bank v.
First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1456 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This alternative explanation accounts for much of the evidence of split votes in these
decisions, especially since the substance of the implied rule lob-5 remedy was at issue in
five of the twelve decisions listed in Table 1 of Professor Grundfest's article in this issue.
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994); Musick, Peeler & Garrett
v. Employers Insurance, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Paupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991); Basic v. tevinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); United States
v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986). A sixth decision related to the implied remedy
available under rule 14a-9. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
Two of the decisions dealt with the arbitrability of claims under the federal securities laws.
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/
American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Of these two, only McMahon
involved arbitration of a rule 10b-5 claim. Only four of these twelve decisions dealt with
the interpretation of express provisions of the 1933 or 1934 Acts. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
November 1995]
interpreting the federal securities laws with an unusually great
frequency."' Professor Grundfest concludes that this pattern of split
votes is consistent with what you would expect when the nine Justices
are forced to decide cases involving interpretation of legislative
inkblots, that is, legislative provisions such as rule 10b-5 that have no
clear, intrinsic meaning.2'
Professor Grundfest sets forth seven factors drawn from the
Court's efforts to interpret the rule 10b-5 remedy.' These seven
factors illustrate why the Central Bank decision should not have been
surprising, but was in fact entirely consistent with the current Supreme
Court's intentionalist analysis of the rule 10b-5 remedy. Moreover,
Professor Grundfest posits that these factors indicate that the Court
does treat this implied action as an "inkblot."'  Finally, Professor
Grundfest concludes that Central Bank's holding has not harmed the
integrity of our nation's capital markets in any demonstrable way.
2 4
All of this leads him to observe that the Supreme Court, faced with
the daunting task of interpreting the cryptic section 10(b) implied
private right of action, has wisely and prudently adopted a narrow,
textualist reading of the statute.'s The Court's "original intent"
approach is preferable because it yields far less confusion and
115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115 (1991); Reves v. Ernst & Young,
494 U.S. 56 (1990); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
Professor Grundfest views this evidence of split votes as reflecting "no clear,
collectively shared meaning" in the federal securities laws. Grundfest, supra note 10, at
55. Instead, this evidence may reflect considerable disagreement among the Justices over
the interpretation of implied remedies, or at least the implied private action under rule
10b-5 that has become firmly planted in the modern landscape of the federal securities
laws.
As such, there is some difficulty in generalizing the evidence of split votes and
unstable coalitions reflected in Table I of Professor Grundfest's article as offering support
for his inkblot hypothesis. Moreover, the alternative explanation offered here does not
need to implicate the question of whether there is an absence of shared understanding of
the federal securities laws among the Justices, nor the issue of whether such an absence
is attributable to a fundamental vagueness or ambiguity in the statute, as has been
suggested by Professor Grundfest.
20. Grundfest, supra note 10, at 45.
21. See id. at 46.
22. Id. at Part III. These factors were discussed as "canons" during the panel
exchange at the Lecture. Transcript-Panel Exchange: The Fourth Annual Fritz B. Burns
Lecture, Central Bank.- The Message, the Methodology, and the Future, 29 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 75, 85-86 (1995) [hereinafter Transcript].
23. See Grundfest, supra note 10, at 58.
24. See id. at Part IV.
25. See id. at 61.
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uncertainty than "the inkblot game the Court is forced to play
whenever it embarks on a search for meaning that is not there.
26
Professor Eisenberg's article offers a profoundly different
perspective on the Court's use of strict textualism to interpret section
10(b) and the implied private action under rule 10b-5.27 Professor
Eisenberg uses Central Bank as a vehicle to show that strict textual-
ism, as employed by the Supreme Court to decide this case, is an
"intellectually incoherent" approach to statutory interpretation.'
His purpose is not to "discuss what the theory of statutory interpreta-
tion should be," but rather to examine the-weaknesses and inadequa-
cies of the Court's reliance on the strict-textualist approach to
interpreting the federal securities laws.29
In Part II of Professor Eisenberg's article, he describes the facts
of Central Bank and reflects that the Court faced an issue that seemed
to be "cut-and-dried."30 In support of this claim, Professor Eisen-
berg points out that "[a]l circuit courts of appeals that had considered
the question had recognized a private right of action against aiders
and abettors under rule 10b-5.2'"
26. Idt at 46.
27. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13 (1995).
28. Id at 14.
29. Id. As to other possible theories of statutory interpretation, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 609 (1990); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo. L.J. 319 (1989); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 321 (1990); Phillip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival
of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241 (1992); McNollgast, Positive
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705
(1992); Nicholas S. Zepoos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward
a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295 (1990); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989); Heidi A.
Sorensen, Note, A New Gay Rights Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 81 GEO. L.J. 2105 (1993).
30. Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 15-18.
31. Id. at 18; see, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982,986 (10th
Cir. 1992); K & S Partnership v. Continental Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971,977 (8th Cir. 1991),
cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 2993 (1992); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th
Cir. 1991); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1475 (1992); Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
dismissed sub nom. Hurdman v. Fine, 502 U.S. 976 (1991); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866
F.2d 935, 946 (7th Cir. 1989); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir.
1987), cer denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (lst
Cir. 1983); ]IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
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Although not discussed by the Supreme Court, the great weight
of precedent on which the Tenth Circuit relied in its Central Bank
decision established that the plaintiff had to prove the following
elements to prevail on an aiding and abetting claim under rule 10b-5:
"(1) the existence of a primary violation of the securities laws by
another; (2) knowledge of the primary violation by the alleged aider-
and-abettor; and (3) substantial assistance by the alleged aider-and-
abettor in achieving the primary violation.1
32
The Tenth Circuit accepted this formulation of aiding and
abetting liability and did not address the threshold issue of whether
such an implied right of action under rule 10b-5 was available in the
first place.3 Instead, the Tenth Circuit's analysis focused on the
question of whether recklessness would satisfy the scienter require-
ment for aiding and abetting liability under rule 10b-5.' The Tenth
Circuit held that recklessness sufficed to meet the scienter require-
ment and defined recklessness as conduct involving "'"an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a
danger.., that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that
the actor must have been aware of it."' .s Accepting this standard
of recklessness as satisfying the scienter requirement of rule 10b-5, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that an aiding and abetting cause of action
against the defendant, Central Bank (Bank), could proceed.
32. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 & n.13 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub
nom. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (citations omitted). The
Tenth Circuit recognized that some circuits had given this three-part test a slightly
different formulation. See id at 898-99 n.13. See generally 9 Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4479-88 (3d ed. 1989) (discussing standards for
establishing aider and abettor liability in civil securities litigation).
33. Harvey L. Pitt, The Demise of Implied Aiding and Abetting Liability, N.Y. L.J.,
May 2, 1994, at 1, 6. "Yielding to 25 years of precedent, the parties assumed aiding and
abetting liability existed, but disputed its scope." Id. As noted by the dissent in Central
Bank, there were literally hundreds of lower court decisions that reached the same result.
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Joel Seligman, The
Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429,1431-32 (1994); Edward Brodsky, Aiding
and Abetting Claims Under Rule 10b-5, N.Y. L., June 14, 1995, at 3. In light of the
considerable body of authority in support of this implied right of action, the Tenth
Circuit's reliance on principles of comity and stare decisis is certainly not surprising.
34. Pring, 969 F.2d at 903. This issue is a matter of considerable disagreement among
the circuits and legal commentators. For a collection of authorities, see id. at 901, and 8
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 3653 n.499.
35. Pring, 969 F2d at 903 (quoting Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114,1118 (10th Cir.
1982) (citations omitted)).
36. See id. at 903-04.
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The Bank petitioned for review of the Tenth Circuit's decision
on two narrow grounds, including the question of whether aiding and
abetting liability could be established by only a showing of reckless-
ness.37 Subsequently, the Supreme Court asked the parties to
address a question that even the Bank thought was settled-whether
any kind of aiding and abetting violated rule 10b-5."8 The Court
then decided that there was no implied private remedy for aiding and
abetting a rule 10b-5 violation, 9 obviating any need to reach the
scienter question that originally formed the basis for the Bank's
petition for certiorari.' The result stunned the legal community.41
Professor Eisenberg's article challenges the reasoning used by
the Court's narrow majority,42 who chose to resolve the issue "solely
on the basis of a literal reading of the text."'43 Although the major-
ity's opinion did refer to certain policy considerations,' these policy
arguments were adduced only to show that the strict-textualist
approach on which its decision rested did not lead to "a result 'so
bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it."'45 The Court then
clouded the matter by expressly stating that its decision did not rest
on these policy considerations.4' This set of mixed signals is an
apparent indication that the Court will proceed in the future by
relying on a strict-textualist approach, at least in matters interpreting
rule 10b-5's implied remedy.
As Professor Eisenberg recognizes, an entirely defensible
opinion could be written to support the Supreme Court's conclusion
37. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Central Bank (No. 92-854); Eisenberg, supra
note 27, at 19. The Bank also sought review of the question of whether "an indenture
trustee [could] be found liable as an aider and abettor absent a breach of the indenture
agreement or other duty under state law." Id.
38. Id.
39. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994). The Court did
not reach the question of whether a showing of recklessness would satisfy the scienter
requirement of rule 10b-5. Id. at 1454-55. This question has been open since the Court's
1976 decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976).
40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i. Central Bank (No. 92-854).
41. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; see also Grundfest, supra note 10, at
43-44 (describing protests of the securities bar and legal commentators).
42. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion in Central Bank and was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. Central Bank, 114
S. Ct. at 1442.
43. Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 20.
44. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453-54.
45. See id; Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 22.
46. Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 22.
[Vol. 29:1
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"that there should be no aiding-and-abetting liability in private actions
under rule 10b-5. 47 As envisioned by Professor Eisenberg, however,
the reasoning of such an opinion would not be predicated on a strict-
textualist approach.4 Instead such an opinion would force the Court
to express candidly the factual and policy premises that underlie its
reasoning. Professor Eisenberg does not believe the Supreme Court's
approach in Central Bank reflects that kind of candor.49
As part of his critique of the Court's strict-textualist approach,
Professor Eisenberg begins by recognizing the problem of identifying
the relevant "text" that defines the parameters of the Supreme
Court's analysis.50 Is the relevant text the language of that particular
statutory provision at issue in the case?5' Or, is the relevant text the
language of the statute as a whole? 2 Or, is it the group of related
statutes,53 as is the case with the set of statutes commonly referred
to by the rubric "the federal securities laws?"' Further compound-
ing the matter is the issue of delineating the role of precedent in
interpreting the relevant statutory language5
As postulated by Professor Eisenberg, these considerations are
made all the more intractable when you consider that liability in
Central Bank was predicated on the violation of an administrative
provision. This raised the threshold question of whether the relevant
text was the language of rule 10b-5 or section 10(b) 6 Professor
Eisenberg takes issue with the majority's determination to focus on
the language of section 10(b) 7 He points out that the Court's
analysis failed to recognize that this statutory provision is not self-
47. Id. at 19.
48. See i at 20.
49. See id. at 20-22.




54. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47) (1994). This section
defines "securities laws" to include the following seven acts: Securities Act of 1933, id.
§§ 77a-77aa; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id §§ 78a-7811; Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, id. §§ 79a to 79z-6; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, id. §§ 77aaa-
77bbbb; Investment Company Act of 1940, id. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64; Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21; and Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, id.
§§ 78aaa-78111.
55. Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 24.
56. I& at 25.
57. Id. at 26.
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executing but rather involves the delegation of fairly broad rule-
making authority to the SEC.58
Assuming that the relevant text can be identified, one must then
consider the problem of ambiguity. Professor Eisenberg offers several
illustrations of how the strict-textualist approach evades the common
sense notion of ambiguity.5 9 In so doing, he points out the flaws of
this approach to statutory interpretation by showing how it overlooks
certain fundamental principles of English.'
Professor Eisenberg also challenges the claim that the strict-
textualist approach serves ,to hold the 'legislature accountable by
limiting'the focus of statutory interpretation to the language of the
statute itself. 61 At another level, Professor Eisenberg posits that
Central Bank can be viewed as a rather crude effort to dodge the
judiciary's responsibilities. As forcefully presented in his remarks
during the Lecture and as more fully developed in his article,
Professor Eisenberg argues that the Court's rigid adherence to
principles of strict textualism can be seen as abdicating its responsibili-
ties-to interpret faithfully and reasonably the instructions it receives
in the form of legislation from its master, Congress.'
Professor Grundfest, however, questions whether the servant can
be faithful in interpreting a provision that was not laid in place by the
master.63 In so framing the dialogue, the speakers have focused our
attention on the horns of the dilemma the Supreme Court faces
whenever it must resolve a dispute involving the scope of an implied
right of action: By definition this is not a remedy that Congress
planted in the landscape of legislation. As Professor Grundfest
vigorously points out, the judiciary-in fulfilling its acknowledged role
of reasonably and faithfully interpreting the instructions of its
master-finds itself hopelessly lost with no reasonable set of directions
to follow.'
58. See iL at 26, 26-27 n.81. Professor Eisenberg notes that this aspect may raise
interesting issues under the Chevron analysis, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), issues which the Court did not fully explore and
which were not the focus of the Bums Lecture. Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 26-27 n.81.
59. Id. at Part V.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 38.
62. See id. at 37.
63. See Grundfest, supra note 10, at 41-42.
64. See id. at 41-42. But note that Professor Eisenberg argues, supra note 27, at Part
VI, that when courts consider all the contextual circumstances and not just the literal text,
they fulfill their well established common-law obligation to interpret statutes so as to
[Vol. 29:1
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Beyond the impact of Central Bank's narrow holding lie the
more profound implications of the Court's reasoning. The ramifica-
tions of the Supreme Court's increasing reliance on the strict-textualist
approach extend well beyond interpreting rule 10b-5's implied private
right of action. The differing perspectives of the Lecture's two
principal speakers emphatically highlights the strengths and weakness-
es of this approach to statutory interpretation. The insightful
observations articulated in these two articles were given further
dimension by the commentary of Simon Lorne and the panel's verbal
tug-of-war over the impact of the Central Bank decision.
As reflected in the contributions of the participants in the Fourth
Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture, the controversy over statutory
interpretation imbedded in Central Bank rages on.' The thoughtful
insights offered both in the Lecture and in this Symposium will play
a significant and influential role in determining the implications of:
"Central Bank: The Methodology, the Message, and the Future."
accomplish legislative objectives by filling in the gaps that inevitably occur, because no
legislation can be finetuned so completely as to address every dispute that may arise.
65. On the eve of the Burns Lecture, the Supreme Court decided Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995), a case involving the scope of the express cause of action
available under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. Id at 1064. In Gustafson, the
Supreme Court concluded that § 12(2) applied only to initial offerings and not to after-
market trading. Id at 1071. In reaching this conclusion, the Court's analysis focused in
large part on the term "prospectus" as used in § 12(2). Id Rather unexpectedly, however,
the Court's analysis did not begin with the definition of prospectus contained in § 2 of the
statute. Instead, the Court stated first that under § 10 of the 1933 Act, the term
prospectus "is confined to a document that, absent an overriding exemption, must include
the 'information contained in the registration statement."' Id. at 1067. This 5-4 decision
once again reflected a sharply divided Court and provoked two dissenting opinions. Id
at 1074-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 1079-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissenting
Justices criticized both (1) the result, on the grounds that the nature of the transaction-a
secondary distribution by control persons-clearly fell within the scope of the statute; and
(2) the reasoning, on the grounds that the analytical approach taken in the Court's prior
decisions dictated that the starting point of the analysis in Gustafson should be the broad
definition of prospectus contained in § 2, which the dissenting Justices believed would
include the allegedly fraudulent materials at issue on the facts of Gustafson. Id at 1074-83.
As such, the recent Gustafson decision reflects the Court's ongoing struggle with the
implications of Central Bank as described by the participants in this year's Bums Lecture,
although any extended discussion of Gustafson was outside the scope of this Symposium.
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